Missouri Law Review
Volume 44
Issue 4 Fall 1979

Article 6

Fall 1979

Taxpayer Standing in Missouri Courts: Alleging the Necessary
Elements
Maureen A. McGhee

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Maureen A. McGhee, Taxpayer Standing in Missouri Courts: Alleging the Necessary Elements, 44 MO. L.
REV. (1979)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

McGhee: McGhee: Taxpayer Standing in Missouri Courts:

TAXPAYER STANDING IN
MISSOURI COURTS: ALLEGING
THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS
Taxpayers' actions, i.e., suits instituted by taxpayers against governmental units to seek relief for alleged illegal or improper acts,I have been
recognized in the United States for many years. 2 It is a form of action currently available in nearly all jurisdictions, 3 either by statute or under common law, for challenging actions of such entities as states, counties,
municipalities, school districts, and sewer districts. 4 In the twentieth century there has been a judicial trend toward easing the restrictions on maintaining such actions.The rule allowing taxpayers' actions was first recognized in Missouri in
Newmeyer v. Missouri & MississippiR.R. ,6 decided in 1873. The court,
after discussing precedents from other jurisdictions, concluded "that the
decisions which affirm the right of plaintiffs, (or those standing in the
same relation to such controversies) to maintain the action, rest upon a
more solid foundation of principle and reason that those holding the contrary doctrine." 7 In subsequent years, the Newmeyer decision was used
repeatedly to justify taxpayers' actions in Missouri." Although Missouri
courts consider the right of a taxpayer to attack illegal official acts as one
firmly embedded in Missouri's common law, 9 it is not free of uncertainties.
Successful prosecution of a taxpayer suit necessitates knowledge of both
the substantive requirements for taxpayer standing in Missouri and the
elements of a taxpayers' suit that should be alleged in the petition.
At the outset, it should be noted that there are some statutory bases for
taxpayers' actions in Missouri. These statutes confer standing upon tax1. Collins v. Vernon, 512 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
2. The earliest successful taxpayers' suit in the United States was apparently Adriance v. Mayor of New York, 1 Barb. 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847). Other early
cases include Foster v. Coleman, 10 Cal. 279 (1858); City of New London v.
Brainard, 22 Conn. 553 (1853); Colton v. Hanchett, 13 Ill. 615 (1852); Mayor of
Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375 (1869); Carlton v. City of Salem, 103 Mass. 141
(1869); Barr v. Deniston, 19 N.H. 170 (1848); Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia,
21 Pa. 147 (1853).
3. Comment, Taypayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895,
895 (1960).
4. See generally 74 AM. JuR.2d Taxpayers' Actions § 6 (1974).
5. Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895,
901 (1960).
6. 52 Mo. 81.
7. Id. at 89.
8. E.g., Collins v. Vernon, 512 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Mo. App. , D.K.C.
1974).
9. Everett v. County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Mo. 1955) ("taxpayers
have always had the remedy of injunction at common law, without aid of
statutory authority, to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public moneys").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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payers under various circumstances. Representative of such statutory
bases is Mo. Rev. Stat. section 108.240 (1978), which provides that a taxpayer has standing to seek an injunction against a municipality or school
district to prevent the registration of bonds that were issued or funded illegally. Obviously, this statute is extremely narrow in scope-it applies
only to actions against municipalities and school districts and can only be
used to prevent the registration of bonds. It also appears that Mo. Rev.
Stat. section 49.500 (1978), although couched in terms of "citizens," may
be construed as conferring standing on taxpayers. That section provides a
method by which fifty resident, solvent and responsible citizens of any
county may, under specified circumstances, have certain county contracts
investigated. If it is found that a contract was not entered into in good faith
or for a just consideration, and without due regard to the best interest of
the county, the circuit court may set aside, reform, or cause to be enforced
any such contract as "the court shall deem best under the law and the
facts." 10 The narrow breadth of this statute, too, is apparent- it is limited
solely to actions challenging contracts entered into by a county.
While such statutory bases are available, it is important to realize that
a taxpayers' action founded upon statutory authority does not supplant the
common law remedy.' Since taxpayers' suits are regarded as existing at
common law in Missouri, statutes authorizing such actions are regarded as
merely cumulative and not exclusive. 12 Given the narrow scope of the
statutory provisions, it would be wise not to rely solely upon them, but to
proceed also under the common law remedy.
There are certain peculiarities and problem areas concerning the requirements for maintaining a taxpayers' action under Missouri common
law that should be considered when contemplating such a suit. First, taxpayers' actions in Missouri apparently are limited to actions against
governmental units or officials. Unlike the restricted coverage of the statutory bases for taxpayer standing, the common law remedy of taxpayers' actions in Missouri is broad in the types of acts and entities that may be
challenged. It also appears that any instrumentality of the government,
state or local, is subject to suit at the instance of a taxpayer under the
10.
11.

RSMo§ 49.500 (1978).
Everett v. County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Mo. 1955).
12. Id. The court stated further:
The applicable rule is "that if the statute gives a remedy in the affirmative, without containing any express or implied negative, for a matter

which was actionable at common law, this does not take away the common law remedy, but the party still may sue at common law, as well as
upon the statute. In such cases the statute remedy will be regarded as

merely cumulative."
Id. at 34, quoting Hickman v. City of Kansas, 120 Mo. 110, 117, 25 S.W. 225,
226 (1894). However, this must not be confused with the question of adequate
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/6
remedy at law. If such exists, it must be pursued; no equitable relief may be
granted. See note 66 infra.
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appropriate circumstances. For instance, Missouri courts have recognized
that taxpayers' actions are maintainable to challenge acts of state officers,' 3 municipal corporations,' 4 counties,1 5 and such limited-power
governmental bodies as school boards 16 and sewer districts.' 7 Such acts
may be challenged on the grounds of being unconstitutional, ' 8 illegal, ' 9 or
fraudulent. 20 The types of actions that may be challenged also are
varied. 2' Missouri taxpayers have maintained actions to enjoin the issuance or sale of bonds; 22 to enjoin the spending of public tax monies for
parochial school purposes 23 or other private purposes such as improvements of a privately owned road; 24 to enjoin the performance of
illegal public contracts; 25 to enjoin the removal of a school build13. Fahey v. Hackmann, 291 Mo. 351, 237 S.W. 752 (1922).
14. Wring v. City of Jefferson, 413 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. 1967).
15. Everett v. County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1955).
16. Eberle v. Plato Consol. School Dist. No. C-5, 313 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1958).
17. Humphreys v. Dickerson, 216 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. 1949).
18. Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d
573 (1953) (alleged violation of U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 5-7, 10, amends. 1 & 14,
and MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8); Hight v. City of Harrisonville, 328 Mo. 549, 41
S.W.2d 155 (En Banc 1931) (alleged violation of MO. CONST. art. 10, § 12).
19. Moseley v. City of Mountain Grove, 524 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. App., D. Spr.
1975); Smith v. Hendricks, 136 S.W.2d 449 (Spr. Mo. App. 1939).
20. Denny v. Jefferson County, 272 Mo. 436, 199 S.W. 250 (1917).
21. This is to be contrasted with federal taxpayer standing. In effect, a
federal taxpayer may only challenge a federal spending program. See Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
The federal spending program must be authorized under the taxing and spending power and not all federal expenditures are founded upon this power. Note,
TaxpayerStanding to Litigate, 61 GEO. L.J. 747, 756 (1973). The taxpayer must
establish that the challenged enactment violates specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power.
See generally Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 CHI. L. REV. 601
(1968). The Flast Court declared that the establishment clause specifically limits
the taxing and spending power but the Court declined to suggest what other constitutional provisions would satisfy that requirement. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at
103. It is obvious that taxpayer standing is much-harder to establish in federal
courts than in the Missouri state courts.
22. E.g., Stein v. Urie, 465 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. 1971); Arkansas-Missouri
Power Corp. v. City of Potosi, 355 Mo. 356, 196 S.W.2d 152 (1946); Bauch v. City of Cabool, 165 Mo. App. 486, 148 S.W. 1003 (Spr. 1912). But see Moseley v.
City of Mountain Grove, 524 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975) wherein the
court held that a taxpayer may not enjoin the issuance of revenue bonds because
these are not paid directly or indirectly by resort to taxation. The payment is
made solely from revenues derived from the facility or utility to be financed by the
bonds.
23. Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d
573 (1953); McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (En Banc 1953).
24. Miller v. Ste. Genevieve County, 358 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1962).
25. Everett v. County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1955) (action to enjoin the purchase and operation of a rock quarry by the county under an illegal
Published
by University
of Missouri
School
LawCity
Scholarship
Repository,
contract);
Wegmann
Realty
Co.of v.
of St. Louis,
329 1979
Mo. 972, 47 S.W.2d 770
(En Banc 1932) (to enjoin performance.of a paving contract); Hight v. City of
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ing; 26 to enjoin the printing on official ballots ofa general election the names of
candidates for office; 27 and even to enjoin the fluoridation of water. 2s
Moreover, although the remedy normally sought in taxpayers' actions is an
injunction, 29 that is not the only type of remedy available. Since these
challenges of governmental action are generally considered equitable in
nature,3 0 taxpayers have available other forms of relief such as declaratory
32
judgments3 ' and recovery of money on behalf of the governmental unit.
Relief in the form of mandamus33 or prohibition3 4 is also possible.
Although there is little uncertainty with regard to the elements of taxpayers' actions mentioned above, a closer investigation of such suits in
Missouri reveals many ambiguous and indefinite requirements. One such
nebulous area concerns a theoretical concept of taxpayers' actions. In the
majority of jurisdictions a taxpayers' suit is thought of as a derivative action,3 5 i.e., a right of action which belongs primarily to the taxing unit
Harrisonville, 328 Mo. 549, 41 S.W.2d 155 (En Banc 1931) (to enjoin contract to
purchase electrical equipment); Hillside Sec. Co. v. Minter, 300 Mo. 380, 254
S.W. 188 (En Banc 1923) (injunction granted against recovery for work done on
bridge pursuant to a void contract).
26. Williams v. School Dist. No. 5, 167 Mo. App. 476, 151 S.W. 506 (Spr.
1912); Tucker v. McKay, 131 Mo. App. 728, 111 S.W. 867 (St. L. 1908).
27. Stocke v. Edwards, 295 Mo. 402, 244 S.W. 802 (En Banc 1922).
28. Readey v. St. Louis County Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. 1961), cert
denied, 371 U.S. 8 (1962).
29. See, e.g., Wring v. City of Jefferson, 413 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. En Banc
1967); Miller v. Ste. Genevieve County, 358 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1962); Everett v.
County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1955); Hight v. City of Harrisonville, 328
Mo. 549, 41 S.W.2d 155 (En Banc 1931); Hawkins v. City of St.Joseph, 281 S.W.
420 (Mo. En Banc 1926).
30. Smith v. Hendricks, 136 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Spr. Mo. App. 1939); Jaffe,
Standing to SecureJudicialReview:PublicActions, 74HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1277
(1961). See generally 74 AM. JUR. 2d Taxpayers'Actions§ 2 (1974).
31. See, e.g., Shively v. City of Keytesville, 241 Mo. App. 239, 238 S.W.2d
682 (K.C. 1951).
32. See, e.g., Smith v. Hendricks, 136 S.W.2d 449 (Spr. Mo. App. 1939).
No case has been cited in which taxpayers have recovered a judgment
for the benefit of a corporation of which they are taxpayers; but, this fact
does not necessarily mean that the taxpayers cannot maintain such a suit
if they have a sufficient interest to entitle them to do so....
... [A] taxpayer in a public corporation can, in a proper case, bring such
a suit on behalf of himself and other taxpayers to recover on behalf of the
corporation.
Id. at 453. This does not change the action from equity to one at law however. "If
the petition states any cause of action it is clearly in equity and not at law." Id. at
452.

33. State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
34. Collins v. Vernon, 512 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
35. See, e.g., Henderson v. McCormick, 70 Ariz. 19, 215 P.2d 608 (1950);
Niklaus v. Abel Constr. Co., 164 Neb. 842, 83 N.W.2d 904 (1957); Grob v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/6
Nelson, 8 Wis. 2d 8, 98 N.W.2d 457 (1959). See generally 74 AM. JUR. 2d Taxpayers'Actions § 2 (1974).

4

McGhee: McGhee: Taxpayer Standing in Missouri Courts:

750

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

with the taxpayers' right to bring the action derived from that right.
Based on this theory, the general rule is that a demand on the proper
public official to bring the action, and his refusal to do so, are conditions
precedent to maintenance of the action.3 6 In contrast, the Missouri courts
apparently have not accepted the derivative nature concept of taxpayers'
actions. s7 In general no demand on the proper public official to bring the
action is required. As might be expected, though, there is an exception. In
the limited situation wherein a taxpayer seeks to recover a money judgment on behalf of the taxing body, the suit is considered to be brought
primarily for the benefit of the taxing unit and the majority rule apparently does apply in Missouri. 38 In such a case, the petition should include an
allegation of demand on, and refusal by, the proper official to bring the
suit.
The traditional rule in most jurisdictions is that the type of tax and the
amount of tax paid is irrelevant. 3 9 Unfortunately, this too can be an area
of uncertainty. It is probable that the payment of income or property taxes
would be sufficient. And, although it is more questionable that payment
of such taxes as gasoline or sales tax would suffice in Missouri, at least one
other jurisdiction has dealt with this issue and has resolved the question in
favor of the taxpayer. 40 It is also the opinion of some that the minuteness of
a plaintiff's tax liability probably will not bar a taxpayer suit. 4 1 Recent
Missouri court decisions have been silent in this regard, but in the 1892
decision of Fugate v. McManama,42 the Missouri Court of Appeals held
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because there had been no evi-

36. See, e.g., People ex rel. City of Chicago v. Schreiber, 322 Ill. App. 452,
54 N.E.2d 862 (1944); Evans v. Metropolitan Util. Dist. of Omaha, 184 Neb. 172,
166 N.W.2d 411 (1969); Mulder v. Village of Amherst, 115 Ohio App. 117, 184
N.E.2d 602 (1962); Miller v. Park City, 126 Tenn. 427, 150 S.W. 90 (1912). See
generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 475, 487 (1951).
37. See Clark v. Crown Drug Co., 348 Mo. 91, 95, 152 S.W.2d 145, 147
(1941) ("A single taxpayer alone may bring such a suit in order to determine the
public interest."); Newmeyer v. Missouri &Mississippi R.R., 52 Mo. 81, 89 (1873)
("The State is not a necessary party to the suit.").
38. See McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (En Banc 1953);
Smith v. Hendricks, 136 S.W.2d 449 (Spr. Mo. App. 1939).
39. See, e.g., Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, 65 Cal. 2d 13, 19, 415 P.2d

769, 772, 51 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1966) (The common law required only that the
plaintiff be a taxpayer supporting the governmental unit whose act is sought to be

challenged.); Wertz v. Shane, 216 Iowa 768, 772, 249 N.W. 661, 663 (1933) (The
right of a taxpayer to institute an action, if it exists at all, is not based on the
amount of taxes paid, or on the form of taxes collected, but on the fact of the payment of taxes.).
40. Regan v. Babcock, 188 Minn. 192, 247 N.W. 12 (1933) (payment of
auto license fee and state gasoline tax held sufficient for purposes of taxpayer
standing).
41. Comment, Municipal Taxpayers and Standing to Sue, 2 BUFFALO L.
Published
University
Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
143 of
(1952).
REV.by 140,
42. 50 Mo. App. 39 (St. L. 189"2).
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dence presented on the amount of taxes paid by them. 43 Because modern
courts have not spoken to this issue, the relevancy of the amount of taxes
paid or payable still may be an open question in Missouri.
Similarly, there are two other areas of taxpayer standing that have
received little judicial attention by Missouri courts, but nevertheless are
worthy of note: the corporate status of a plaintiff and the residence of the
plaintiff. In view of the numerous taxpayer proceedings instituted by corporate taxpayers in the past without objections on the basis of their corporate status, 44 it would seem that such a taxpaying entity has as much
right to institute a taxpayers' action as does any other taxpayer. Consequently, the fact that the plaintiff-taxpayer is a corporation appears to be
irrelevant.
On the other hand, the relevance or irrelevance of the plaintiff's residence for purposes of taxpayers' actions is not as apparent. It has been
asserted that the place of residence is immaterial since a plaintiffs interest
as a taxpayer is no less merely because he is not a resident of the taxing
body.4 5 Recently, though, in Bopp v. Spainhower,46 the Missouri Supreme
Court suggested that residence in the taxing unit is a requirement for taxpayer standing. 47 This would seem to preclude, for example, an Illinois or
Kansas resident who frequently uses Missouri highways and occasionally
pays a gasoline tax in Missouri from seeking to enjoin the construction of a
Missouri highway.
The concept of taxpayers' suits as class actions presents another ambiguity. Many legal writers suggest that a taxpayers' action is invariably a
class action, 48 i.e., the taxpayer brings the action on behalf of himself and
all other taxpayers similarly situated. Missouri courts appear to follow a
43. The answer does not deny the allegation that they are 'taxpaying
citizens,' but the evidence is entirely silent upon the amount of taxes
which they pay, or have paid, or are liable to pay; and, for aught that the
record discloses, their interest in the matter may be almost infinitesimal
.... Because the interests of the plaintiffs may be merely infinitesimal,
so that their quest may be subject to the maxim De minimis non curat
lex, we must hold that they do not disclose on this record any adequate
reason for moving a chancellor to grant the extraordinary relief they
seek.
Id. at 42-43 (emphasis in original).
44. See, e.g., Aquamsi Land Co. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 346 Mo. 524,
142 S.W.2d 332 (1940); Missouri Serv. Co. v. City of Stanberry, 341 Mo. 500, 108
S.W.2d 25 (1937); Hillside Sec. Co. v. Minter, 300 Mo. 380, 254 S.W. 188 (En
Banc 1923); Civic League v. City of St. Louis, 223 S.W. 891 (Mo. 1920).
45. Comment, Municipal Taxpayers and Standing to Sue, 2 BUFFALO L.
REV. 140, 143 (1952).
46. 519 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
47. Id. at 286. ("Since plaintiff resides in St. Louis County we rule that he
does not have standing to attack the St. Louis City classification.").
48. See Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/6
895 (1960); Note, Taxpayers' Suits as a Means of Controllingthe Expenditure of
PublicFunds, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1937).
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different view. Taxpayer suits have been maintained in Missouri even
though brought merely on behalf of the named plaintiffs. 49 As a practical
matter, the distinction has little effect on the result as the courts' analyses
apparently remain the same in either case. 50
Nevertheless, there are some considerations related to bringing a taxpayers' suit as a class action that should not be disregarded. The petition
would have to include allegations required for bringing a class action 51
such as adequate and fair representation of the class by the named plaintiffs. 52 Further, this requirement that the plaintiff adequately and fairly
represent the class may be of importance in other contexts. For example, a
public official wishing to implement an illegal action could attempt to insure its success by arranging a taxpayers' class action. At his request, a taxpayer might bring such a suit with less-than-vigorous presentation of his
case, resulting in defeat and possible binding effects on other taxpayers.
An attorney alert to the potential problem of such collusive suits may want
to challenge the plaintiff-taxpayer's right to represent the class.
The foregoing elements and requirements of taxpayer standing may
be uncertain and may present traps for the unwary, but usually do not pose
difficult roadblocks to the maintenance of taxpayer actions in Missouri.
The major obstacle to obtaining taxpayer standing in the Missouri courts
has been the requirement that the injury sought to be remedied be
"peculiar to the taxpayers ...[and] distinct from the general public."5 3 In
Missouri, taxpayer standing is generally contingent on a showing by the
taxpayer of a personal stake in the outcome. To satisfy this requirement
the general rule in Missouri has been that the taxpayer must have a
pecuniary interest in the subject of the action-he must show that the acts
challenged will result in an increased tax burden to the taxpayer and to
taxpayers as a class." 4 In taxpayers' suits the pecuniary interest doctrine
49. See, e.g., Wring v. City of Jefferson, 413 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. En Banc
1967); Stocke v. Edwards, 295 Mo. 402, 244 S.W. 802 (En Banc 1922); Collins v.
Vernon, 512 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
50. Compare Collins v. Vernon, 512 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974)
with Everett v. County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1955).
51. Mo. R. CIV. P. 52.08.
52. Hribernik v. Reorganized School Dist. R-3, 276 S.W.2d 596 (9t. L. Mo.
App. 1955) (taxpayers' action to enjoin collection of school tax allegedly approved at void election, where the plaintiffs did not allege that they were chosen
to represent whole class, and that they adequately and fairly represented whole
class, did not qualify as representatives of class and could not maintain the action).
53. Stocke v. Edwards, 295 Mo. 402, 413, 244 S.W. 802, 804 (En Banc
1922).
54. See, e.g., id. ("plaintiff and other taxpayers will be specially and individually damaged by the threatened unlawful act of defendants, through an increase in the burden of taxation upon their property"); Smith v. Hendricks, 136
1939)
("taxpayers'
burden
S.W.2d
449, 455of(Spr.
Mo.School
App.of Law
Published
by University
Missouri
Scholarship
Repository,
1979must be increased").
The majority of other jurisdictions also follow the pecuniary interest doctrine.
See, e.g., Housing Auth. v. Richardson, 196 So. 2d489 (Fla. App. 1967); Westen
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has been the dominant theme running throughout the Missouri opinions.-

5

The underlying rationale for the pecuniary interest doctrine is that
taxpayers are, in equity, the owners of both the property and the public
funds of a governmental unit by virtue of their tax payments, and that the
waste or unlawful use of the property or fund would directly or indirectly
result in an increase in taxes. 5 6 It is clear that taxpayers have the right to
enjoin the unlawful expenditure of public funds because of their equitable
ownership of such funds and their obligation to replenish the same in case
they are expended. 7 This is certainly not unreasonable.
Yet, when strictly applied, this theory could reach absurd results. It is
difficult to discern a taxpayer's personal stake in the outcome, based on
a pecuniary interest, when there is only a slight possibility that his tax
burden will be increased and the amount of the possible increase to the
plaintiff is trifling.18 In addition, this theory overlooks a factor equally as
important as illegal increases in tax burdens- the essentially public interest nature of taxpayers' suits in insuring that illegal action by public
officials will be remedied. 5 9 And, in litigation, the taxpayers' pecuniary interest may be used as a facade to cover the genuinely motivating interest
which could be a mere desire to further a partisan political goal.60 There
v. City of Allen Park, 37 Mich. App. 121, 194 N.W.2d 542 (1971). See generally
74 AM. JUR. 2d Taxpayers'Actions § 2 (1974).

55. See, e.g., Everett v. County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1955);
Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d 573
(1953).
56. See, e.g., People v. Holten, 287 Ill. 225, 231, 122 N.E. 540, 542 (1919);
Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 137, 260 S.W.2d 573,
581 (1953). See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 475 (1951).
57. See, e.g., Castilo v. State Highway Comm'n, 312 Mo. 244, 279 S.W. 673
(En Banc 1925).
58. No Missouri case has been cited, nor have we been able to find one,
in which it is held that an injunction suit would lie on behalf of the taxpayers where the petition affirmatively showed, upon its face, that
neither the taxpayers nor the corporation on whose behalf they sought to

recover, had not suffered, or would not suffer any pecuniary loss, however infinitesimal.
Smith v. Hendricks, 136 S.W.2d 449, 457 (Spr. Mo. App. 1939).
59. See generallyJaffe, Standing to SecureJudicialReview: PublicActions,
74 HARV. L. REv. 1265 (1961).

60.
(1960).

Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895

Because the motive of a taxpayer-plaintiff is viewed as irrelevant,
taxpayers' suits afford a means of mobilizing the self-interest of individuals within the body politic to challenge legislative programs, prevent illegality, and avoid corruption. Taxpayers' suits thus create an army of
potential private attorneys general acting on whatever private incentives
may induce them to spend the time and money to bring a taxpayers' suit:
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/6
personal economic gain, partisan political objectives, desire to attract
personal publicity, or to delay unwanted public projects, or to prevent
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are conversely many valid interests of taxpayer-citizens the infringement of
which would not give rise to any increased taxes. For instance, a government official's nonadherence to a political election process mandated by
statute would impinge on a taxpayer-citizen's interest in seeing that officials abide by such election process, yet conceivably would not result in any
increase in taxes, directly or indirectly. With a strict application of the
pecuniary interest doctrine, an illegal official act that did not hit the taxpayers' pocketbook would go unchallenged.
Missouri courts could possibly adopt a more positive approach toward
allowing such actions. For example, 6' assume a corporation's home office
is situated in Missouri and next to a public highway with a major city park
adjoining the highway on the other side. The corporation has a pressing
need to expand its existing facilities, but the only practical method of accomplishing this is to extend its building over the public highway. In order
to make this possible, the city directs a conveyance of land encompassing a
portion of the highway to the corporation. Citizen-taxpayers, concerned
that such expanded facilities will block their view and diminish their enjoyment of the city park, bring an action against the city seeking to enjoin the
conveyance on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Is it likely that a motion to dismiss by the city will be sustained by the trial judge on the basis
that the plaintiffs have failed to allege facts which demonstrate their
standing to sue?
A study of Missouri case law indicates that suits of this nature are
generally short-lived. 62 However, this situation is one in which it would be
desirable for Missouri courts to rule in favor of the taxpayers on the standing issue and not follow the traditional "added tax burden" requirement.
In the hypothetical there is no allegation of a financial injury to the plaintiff-taxpayers or of any increase in taxes. It is merely alleged that the city's
action will ruin the plaintiffs' view of the city park- a purely aesthetic injury. If a Missouri court should find this injury adequate for purposes of
taxpayer standing, it would expand the protected interests of taxpayers
from pecuniary to other areas.
Extending the possible variations in the hypothetical example one step
further, it soon becomes apparent that an injury or damage sufficient to
confer standing on an individual may present itself in several forms: harm
to aesthetic or environmental well-being may qualify as an injury deservexpenditures believed to be socially or economically unwise.
Id. at 904. It is not difficult, however, to see an inconsistency between this general
rule that motives are irrelevant and the pecuniary interest doctrine. If a taxpayer
brings a baseless suit, he forces the governmental unit to pay the costs of defending such suit and the possible additional costs caused by the delay in implementing the government action. This raises taxes, theoretically, for all taxpayers.
61. This hypothetical is based on the fact situation present in McKenna v.
Poelker, No. 38988 (Mo. App., D. St. L., April 11, 1978), an unpublished opinPublished
by University
of MissouriasSchool
Law Scholarship
Repository,
1979 Supreme Court.
ion which
was dismissed
mootofafter
transfer to
the Missouri
62. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
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ing of legal protection. This proposed advancement in the law of taxpayer
standing would add a new dimension to such suits, moving beyond the narrow constraints of the past in which taxpayers' actions were merely
methods of controlling the expenditure of public funds. A taxpayer's
pecuniary interest would no longer be the only basis on which to gain taxpayer standing. The taxpayer would be able to address other and more
varied action by public officials that closely affects him. To illustrate, if
Missouri courts adopt the view espoused in the hypothetical decision, it
would be possible for a Missouri taxpayer to obtain taxpayer standing to
enjoin a Missouri state official from improperly permitting hunting on
state property where the only injury that the taxpayer could suffer by the
improper action would be harm to his environmental interest in protecting
wildlife. In addition, this extension of protection to other interests of the
taxpayer would further an objective of taxpayers' litigation, i.e., enabling
the activities of public authorities to be subjected to greater judicial
scrutiny through the medium of taxpayers' suits. 6 3 Missouri courts could
even further expand the scope of taxpayer actions, or could in the future
contract it. While federal standing is constitutionally required,6 4 the
Missouri taxpayer standing requirement is apparently a judicially imposed
doctrine of self-restraint.65 It follows that relaxing the requirements for
standing and broadening the scope of taxpayers' actions are within the
power of Missouri courts.
Finally, it is generally true that equitable defenses are available in taxpayers' suits as they are in any other equitable proceeding. The same rules
are applicable. In particular, the adequacy of legal remedies would be a
good defense to a taxpayers' suit 66 as would the doctrine of laches. 67 Relief
has even been denied on the broad ground that to grant the relief prayed
for would be "inequitable. 68 The doctrine of unclean hands also seems to
be an available defense in these types of actions in Missouri. 69 In this
63. Comment, Taxpayers'Suits:A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895,
904 (1960).
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
65. An investigation of the Missouri Constitution reveals no express standing
requirements. The Missouri Constitution does empower the Missouri Supreme
Court to promulgate rules of procedure and practice for all Missouri courts. See
MO. CONST. art. 5, § 5.
66. E.g., Glueck Realty Co. v. City of St. Louis, 318 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1958)
(plaintiff denied injunction in taxpayers' suit; proper remedy condemnation proceeding); Civic League v. City of St. Louis, 223 S.W. 891 (Mo. 1920) (plaintiff
taxpayer denied injunction; proper remedy quo warranto).
67. E.g., Graves v. Little Tarkio Drainage Dist. No. 1, 345 Mo. 557, 134
S.W.2d 70 (1939).
68. Stamper v. Roberts, 90 Mo. 683, 3 S.W. 214 (1887).
69. See Peltzer v. Gilbert, 260 Mo. 500, 169 S.W. 257 (1914). The general
view in other jurisdictions, however, is that the defense of unclean hands is not
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/6
available in taxpayer suits. See, e.g., Brooker v. Smith, 108 So. 2d 790, 794 (Fla.
App. 1959); Stahl Soap Corp. v. City of New York, 187 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (1959).

10

McGhee: McGhee: Taxpayer Standing in Missouri Courts:

756

MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44

regard, it is interesting to note the general rule that the motives of the
plaintiff are irrelevant to the issue of taxpayer standing.70 As one Missouri
court has said, "The mere fact that a taxpayer may have an interest in the
litigation in addition to his financial interest as a taxpaying citizen is no
defense, since his motive in exercising a legal right is not material."'"
Nonetheless, if the plaintiff's primary motive is such as to be dishonest,
unethical, or unconscionable, the maxim of unclean hands may be successfully invoked in Missouri courts. This notion was demonstrated in
Peltzer v. Gilbert,7 2 where two taxpayers were denied relief on the ground
that their motive was not to protect the county treasury but rather to help
an accused in a criminal trial.
It is obvious that the law of taxpayer standing in Missouri consists of
many areas that are indefinite and still developing, along with other areas
that are relatively straightforward. Nonetheless, there are still technically
required allegations the omission of which could be fatal to a petition. A
cautious person desiring to challenge an act of a state or local governmental entity or official should include in his petition allegations of his status as
a taxpayer and resident, the bases on which the action is challenged as being unconstitutional or illegal, and any theoretical possibility of an increased tax burden. However, it is hoped that in the future, even in the
absence of a pecuniary injury, an allegation of an injury to other legally
protected interests, such as the aesthetic or environmental interests of the
plaintiffs, will be sufficient to satisfy the personal stake in the outcome
requirement. If the plaintiff is seeking to recover a money judgment on
behalf of the taxing unit, a demand on and refusal to bring the action by
the proper official should be alleged. Naturally, should the plaintiff wish
to bring a class action, the allegations required of such an action also must
be pleaded. With inclusion of these elements, a Missouri taxpayer's standing to challenge a state or local governmental action is prima facie
demonstrated and will survive a motion to dismiss.
MAUREEN A. MCGHEE
70.
71.
72.

See note 65 supra.
Everett v. County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Mo. 1955).
260 Mo. 500, 169 S.W. 257 (1914).
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